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In the new era of critical self-wnsciousnesb the discipline rewgnizes that its domain is as A much defined by the characteristic fonns of its reasoning, the intrinsic nature of its knowledge I I and information, and its competing theories of concepts and their relationships-as by the elementary specification of raw material, scale of study, and methodology. Explanation, interpretation, wncepts and theory become wmmon central topics of debate and develop the esential significance of archaeological logic, epistemology and metaphysics. It is apparent the that archaeologists need to know about knowing and the limits of what they can and cannot form or national wntext. Selfknow from the data and to know this by critical archaeology has become a series of appraisal, not simply by assertion. Demoralizing but fundamental questioning developsgiven what we now know about the limitations education systems and with regionally of the data, concepts and methods, how do we ed bodies of archaeological theory and know what we appear to know reiiably? Given that many explanations, models and theories may all be sirnultaneously appropriate at many different levels and in different contexts, how do we choose between them? The astringent scrutiny of articles of faith and the burden of choice indeed represent an ordeal by fire-a painful refinement in the critical fiame. The needs of teaching emerge as one of the main disciplinary propellants into the space of expanding consciousness-student and amateur provide the fuel, research sparks ignition and the disciplinary elders monitor and direct in a series of contradictory instructions. A ding of its internal structure and the new environment deveiops as students and of the external environment. Focus amateurs of an ever-widening background emerge in increasing numbers and archaeological units of a11 kinds multiply outside as well as inside the old Euro-American centres. From the Antipodes to Africa the old regionally selfcentred 'colonial' wncepts are severely challenged and their weaknesses gravely exposed in the wider general debate. Question leads to unrest, freedom to further self-consciousness &stations. If the Çst revolution from wnsciousand thought about thought, as the unformulated
to self-wnsciousness is mainly technical precepts of limited academic traditions give way d threshold is largely a philosoto clearly formulated wncepts whose very ical and theoretical one brought formulation leads to further criticism and more Alexander, 1964, 58) . The rate of change becomes as disconcerting as the uncertainty, insecurity and general unrest-no one can deny the high price of expanding consciousness. It is as unrealistic to ignore this contemporary context of debate as it is to portray these changes as painless moves from historic ignorance to archaeological enlightenment; each archaeology is of its time but since many deplore the time they will certainly be unhappy with its archaeology. The disciplinary system is after all an adaptive one, related internally to its changing content and extemally to the spirit of the times. Past archaeological states were appropriate for past archaeological contexts, and past explanations were very much related to past archaeological states of lcnowledge (e.g. short chronologies) and our own are no better in these respects. However, formerly adaptive qualities frequently become disadvantageous vices in new environments and if archaeological development is not too closely to resemble genetic ageing, with its dramatic terminus, then there has to be a critical and continuous monitoring process to regulate development. Otherwise there is an accumulation of errors and a build-up of multiple failures which would demand a simultaneous spasmodic correction of global proportions. In the extreme case, formerly adaptive, traditional archaeological positions can evolve in the new environment into monofocal, monodimensional and myopic specialization, conformist authoritarianism, academic regionalism and individualism, archaeological isolationism and chauvinism; the attributes of a doomed race of disciplinary dinosaurs.
THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
The transition of archaeology from noble innocence to self-consciousness and critical selfconsciousness has been artificially condensed within such a spasm of an unusually abrupt and severe kind. Historical and technological developments have coincided in a remarkably rapid change in disciplinary environment and rontent in the decades following World War 11, ompressing these phases of transition within Many archaeologists will be unwilling to face the chalienge of the new situation and may either entrench thernselves in traditional positions or retreat within the logically impervious bastion of the freely creative artist. However, although these reactions are understandable they are based upon two quite mistaken beliefs; that we can indefinitely avoid the challenge of new conditions by. retuming to prirnitive paradigms; and that the deployment of artistry and imaginative creativity have no place amongst the new materiais and new approaches. By retreating within traditional forms it is always possible to alleviate but never to banish the fresh burden of new decisions (Alexander, 1964, 10- The realization has also dawned in archaeology that mathematical methodology, a massive field in itself, provides many new possibilities. The appreciation that these methods are languages of expression and deal as much with order and relationships as magnitudes has introduced almost every branch of mathernatics into archaeological contexts-from mathematical logic, to axiomatia, set and group theory, vectors, topology, probability, statistics, boolean algebra, matrix algebra, n-space geometry, numerical taxonomy, error and confidente estimates, . combinatoria, linear prograrnming, garne theory, optimization methods, location-ailocation techniques and many more (Clarke, 1968; Gardin, 1970; Kolchina and Shera, 1970;  Hodson, Kendaii and Tautu, 1971) .
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These reinforcing developments in excavation, analysis, measurement and manipulative machinery give added scope to the two other major fields of methodological innovationexplicit model-using and experimentation, and the comprehensive theory of systems and cybemetia (Clarke, 1972b, 29-44) .
Nevertheless, even amongst this explosive variety of new methodology two developments have emerged with repercussions which potentially dwarf the others-computer methodology and isotope chronology.
Computer methodology provides an expanding armoury of analog and digital techniques for computation, experimentation, simulation, visuai display and graphic analysis. These sense-extending machine tools can either be used liie the microscope to examine the fine structure of low-leve1 entities and processes in minute detail, or like the telescope to scrutinize m s i v e ensembles over vast scales. They also pmvide powerfuí hammer-and-anvil procedures to beat out archaeological theory from intransigent data-thus on one hand these methods can be used to construct models and simulate their consequences over a range of states, identifying I test-conditions-on tne other hand the computer may be used to analyse and test real data and measure our expectations under the model against the reality.
Whilst a11 thinking archaeologists must share severe reservations about what has yet been achieved with the aid of these tools, the fault is with the uncertain archaeologist and his shaky concepts, not with the machine; the new generation of archaeological craftsmen have yet to master the potential of the new tool. Indeed, a major embarrassment of the computer has been that it has enabled us to do explicitly things which we had always claimed to do intuitively-in so many cases it is now painfully clear that we were not only deceived by the intuitions of innoce-but that many of the things we wished to do could not be done or were not worth doing and many unimagined things can be done; we must abandon sarne objectives and approach others in different ways. Harnessing powerful new methodological horses to rickety old conceptual carts has proved to be a powerful but drastic way of improving archwlogical theoretical constructs by elimination.
The chronological consequences of isotope and other dating methods, especially the Carbon-14, Potassium-Argon, and Uranium series techniques, have infiltrated archaeological thinking in a manner which has largely concealed the significance of their repercussions. It has become increasingly apparent that the archaeologist must now think directly in terms of the kinked and distorted time surfaces of the chronometric scales which he actuaily uses-Carbon-14 time, Potassium-Argon time, and typological time-where the error factors are almost more important than the scale graduations. In another aspect, the transformation of archaeological time from ultra-short to very long chronologies has had unsuspected and littlediscussed consequences for archaeological metaphysics, entity concepts, processes and explanations.
Under the ultra-short chronologies, archaeological time was confused with historical time and seemed packed with data and events; largescale phenomena appeared to take place in swift interludes-hence the prevalence of 'invasionexplanations. This situation is precisely equivalent to that underlying the 'catastrophe' theories of 18th-century geology and we should note the connexion between time scale, explanation and theory, since it is now exceedingly doubtful that the archaeologist can continue to use the old stock of political, historical and ethnic explanatory models in this direct way. Thus, to interpret the French Mousterian sequence, of more than 30,000 years duration, in terms of the acrobatic manoeuvrings of five typological tribes is tantàmount to an attempt to explain the Vietnam war in terms of electron displacements. Political, historical and ethnic entities and processes of these kinds cannot yet be perceived at that scale in that data, even if they then existed and even with our latest sense-extension and detection devices.
A fundamental lesson emerges-the consequences arising from the introduction of new methodologies are of far greater significance than the new introductions themselves. We must move from the traditional model of archaeological knowledge as a Gruykre cheese with holes in it to that of a marse susvension of information particles of varying size, not even randomly distributed in archaeological space and time. The first thing we may deduce from this revision is that many of our taxonomic entity divisions are defined by lines drawn through gaps in the evidence and zones of greatest ignorante; this does not make these taxa invalid but it does gravely alter what constitutes meaningful manipulation and explanation of such entities. Now although these problems become less severe with later material they tend to become more subtle and they never entirely disappear. We must face the fact that although they may with care be mapped on to other disciplinary domains, , archaeological observations, entities, procesws and explanations remain archaeological animals and they are a11 scale, context, sample, paradigm and ultimately metaphysics dependent.
The huge content of the new and newly extended methodologies is self-evident. However, it has not been sufficiently grasped that,
ARCHAEOLOGY: T H E L O S S OF I N N O C E N C E they are, these methods form only
it is hardly surprising that groups of practithe new environment tioners have broken free from traditional portant in their own conformity and realigned themselves around the ew information they provide and study of the special problems of limited tual consequences.
dimensions of the new evidence. Although their illary methods do not alter the roots are old, we suddenly have a number of ture of the discipline and we must vigorous, productive and competitive new paradigms which have condensed around the morphological, anthropological, ecological and geographical aspects of archaeological data (Clarke, 1972b, 6-53 Nm Philosophes The threshold of critical disconformit~ to a localized disciplinary self-consciousness is currenfly ever, effectiveness cannot being traversed as the inevitable consequence of rificed to stability, and the social and technical revolution in archaeoations, models and theories logy. The old disciplinary system could not ly contain, suppress, or accommòdate the accumulation of discordant new information within its structure, so the system has adapted by exploring a range of new philosophies and from which will slowly emerge, after e, those most capable of accommodating both the old and the new information and aspirations compatibly. of the new observations of no lesS
The new ideologia and philosophies therethan the explanator~ and ' Oncepfore present no simple new orthodoxy but heterodox diversity; the strength of the new archaeologies, or New Archaeology, is that it introduces a variety of questions where only answers were formerly proclaimed and discirgy, urbanization and plinary exhaustion a certitude. The era of critica1 self-consciousness has therefore dawned with the explicit scrutiny of the philosophical nzs In this information explosion assumptions which underpin and constrain A N T I Q every aspect of archawlogical reasoning, knowledge and concepts; some of the possible developments of these aspects will be touched upon below (New Consequences).
T H E N E W ARCHAEOLOGY
Do these developments represent a 'New Archaeology' ? Well of c o m e it depends on the point of view of the observer and what the observer wishes to see. However, it does seem difficult to sustain the view that the character, scale and rapidity of recent change is of no greater signifícance than that experienced in other twenty-year spans of archaeological development. We seem rather to have witnessed an interconnected series of dramatic, intersecting and international developments which together may be taken to define new archaeologies within a New Archaeology; whether we choose to use these terms or avoid them is then mainly a personal, political and semantic decision. We can define a poetwar quantitative and qualitative revolution in the numbers and variety of archaeological amateurs, students, departments, excavations, equipment and methods. At first, it seemed these were merely numerical and technical changes which could easily be assimilated. However, the new methods produced new observations and fresh potential which could not be reconciled with the existing disciplinary system. New paradigms emerged as a response to this situation and now new ideologies and philosophies are being developed to reset the new archaeological information within an appropriate disciplinary frame and metaphysical field space.
The New Archaeology is an interpenetrating set of new methods, new observations, new paradigms, new philosophies and new ideologies within a new environment. I t is not virtuous simply because it is new; many elements are unsound, inaccurate or wrong but that is equally true of much of traditional archaeology. Nevertheless, some of the new developments are unassailable and all of them are explicit, experimental attempts to grapple with, rather than avoid, the fundamental problems of archaeology ; a critica1 self-consciousness which healthilv extends to self-critical self-consciou+-ness, the new archaeology monitoring and controlling the new archaeology (LeRoy Johnson, 1972, 374) .
The financia1 and intellectual cost of these developments is severe and interposes rather subtle dangers. Traditional confidente and habitual d&iplinary security cnunble into the insecurity of critical self-consciousness and professional uncertainty, posing the heavy burden of choice within a vastly enlarged conceptual arena. Authority seems challenged by anarchy as familiar concepts collapse under testini traditional guidelkes dissolve and decisions become more düKcult. New questions are asked but not always answered. Disreputable old battles, long fought and long decided in other disciplines are imported into archaeology to be needlhly refought with fresh bloodletting. Even the new methods subtly threaten to redefine our basic concepts, entities and processes for us; sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, emphasizing the essential need for clear logical, epistemological and metaphysical control of archaeology by archaeologists-the price of freedom is eternal vigilance (Clarke, 1972a).
T H E N E W CONSEQUENCES
Theory of Cmepts I t has become clear that every archaeologist has thoughtfully or unthinkingly chosen to use concepts of a certain kind-thus committing himself to a.metaphysical position, restricting himself to certain paradigms, to use certain methodologies, to accept certain modes of explanation and to pursue certain airns; at the same time explicitly or tacitly rejecting other metaphysical positions, paradigms, methods, explanations and aims. In each era archaeologists represent the temporary state of their disciplinary knowledge by a metaphysical theory which presents appropriate ideals of explanation and procedure. But metaphysical systems are not systems of obsenrations but invented systems of concepts without which we cannot think (Harré, 1972, 1-39).
Archaeological metaphysics is the study and evaluation of the most general categoria and F
ARCHAEOLOGY: THE L O S S O F INNOCENCE
I mncepts within which archaeologists think; a Feak long overdue (Clarke, 1g72a). Unknowing devotion to one metaphysical system prevents the recognition of those of other archaeologists, md critical self-awareness is therefore the first step to the comprehension of the position of others and the bursting of the bonds tied by one's own metaphysical assumptions. Metaphysical systems may be invented ensembles and the archaeologist may be free to choose according to whim, since the choices are not between right ahd wrong; but judgement can still be exercised in terms of the validity of the concepts selected, the appropriateness of the ensuing explanation for the scale of concept selected and then the adequacy and power of that explanation thereafter.
This approach reveals that archaeologists, old and new, have adopted many quite different malytical concepts. The 'historid' school have preferred the imagined historical individual, or p u p of individuals, acting at the personal scale within events of a comparable level; appropriate explanation has therefore been in terms of the states and reasons attributed to these actors laid out in rational and dispositional explanations. The 'physical' school have preferred models ranging in scale from particle clouds to networks and billiard balls, thus díversifying causal and probabilistic explana-' tio118 from diffusion waves in media, to systemic interaction and invasive displacement. I t is amusing to note that just as 'invasion' explanations were conditioned by the metaphysics of the short chronologies and produced a reaction towards 'autonomous' explanations, so 'autonomous' explanations become meaningless amongst networked communities. Indeed the capacity of qhaeology to reinvent for itself archaic explanation structures long abandoned in other fields is remarkable-invasion 'catastrophism' can be joined by the currently fashionable autonomous 'spontaneous generation' explanations and that mysterious 'phlogiston' civilization.
Archaeological entities, processes and explanations are bound by metaphysical concepts of time and space. So we may expect chronological and spatial revisions to be followed by profound disciplinary consequences. But, the very great importante of time and space measurement scales has often led the archaeologist to confuse the scales used for measurement with that which is being measured. Space and time are conceptual t e m relative to the existente of complex phenomena; they exist because of the observed phenomena and not vice versa. Time and space are relative to some obsewed system, and a key step in archaeological interpretation is a model approach towards the meaning of time and space for the inrnates of particular systems. The mobile Palaeolithic band moving on foot with limited external contacts and an extremely rapid generational turnover presents a very different time and space surface from the Iron Age society with elaborate transport, extensive international contacts and a slower generational turnover, even when occupying the same territory over a similar timespan. The measurement scale must not be confused with the relationships being measured and, in particular, forms of explanation should not be inappropriate to the error and graduation range of particular time and space scales.
The exposure of archaeological metaphysics to critica1 appraisal allows us the self-conscious capacity to consider the possibilities of altering or rejecting current disciplinary concepts in favour of some alternative forrns. Thus, at the moment, archaeology is still a discipline in which artifacts, assemblages, sites and their contents are identified and related as relicts of communities in accordance with rules formulated in terms of artifact taxonomies-the traditional Montelian paradigm. But these artifact taxonomies are merely systems of a @ri rules whereby the relation or identification of the archaeological configurations that are to bear taxonomic labels is guideá and wntrolled by taxonomic postulates. So some practitioners within the ecological and geographical paradigms rnight suggest that we abandon artifact taxonomy as the primary system for organizing, classifying and naming archaeological entities and devise some other system of classification, perhaps in terms of landscape and activity units of some kind. Now, although there is a Neo-Montelian response to this suggestion, the -ANTIQUITY is that fundamental speculation at cotraditions-introduces a number of epistemis exceedingly important if only ological problems. Whatever their status, we the metaphysical certainly use these theoretical t e m to make are normally reference and to relate observations. Now some inciined to rethink it.
hypothetid entities may prove to be real things, qualities, or processes and may be Theory of infomurtion The problerns of partially or completely demonstrated in due information processing and nomenclature bring course (the 'Wus' was just such a concept) but us inio the field of archaeological epistemology others are merely surnmarizing terms-of--the theory of archaeological information conveniente employed to simphfy complex (Clarke, 1972a) . This will entail a critical and expressions (the mechanical concept of 'force' seíf-conscious concern with the kinds of for exarnple) (Harré, 1972, 91-9) . Now information which archaeological methods archaeology has been much vexed by the might yield about the past, together with the problem of whether its hypothetical entities are limitations and obscurities imposed on the one 'real'; it had been intuitively assumed that they hand by the nature of the record and on the were so but the technical revolution which has other by our languages of expression. . allowed us to test for their existence reveals that FT&chaeologists have certainly failed to ackthey are structurally very complex and their nowledge the degree to which the nature of the 'reality' is still a matter of debate. However, archaeological record has imposed itseíf upon even should the reaù'ty of our hypothetical -archaeological concepts. To a very large extent entities tum out to be of the latter merely archaeological referential form, their utility need not dirninish. ifacts' of the Aithough the Montelian paradigm was only a I nature of the elements in the samples and their hypothetical mechanism which offered an ' aberrant distributioethe nature of the account of the nature of archaeological data and entities arising in the main from the informaexplanations of its relationship to horninid 8 tion characteristics of archaeological channels behaviour, to be a Montelian under traditional as largely equifinal, functional groupings, many the information which may be extracted from thousandr of years deep and hundred of miles the complex, integrated relationships encapsu-ARCHAEOLOGY: T H E appropriate way. After d, since that we will never be able to e the sites of a contemporaneous site or, what is more to the point, given our pecialized hunting and fishing sites of k d s , like Mugharet-el-Wad.
Whether the last sentence a reasonable speculation depends the data, partly on the concepts and the reasoning involved. The critical archaeological reasoning basic importance of for those conclusions, between explanations or causes of observations. The slippery L O S S O F I N N O C E N C E nature of the logical aspects of archaeological explanation becomes apparent in the frequent confusions between the direct causes of archaeological observations and the explanation of the mechanism which brought about those causal stimuli at a yet deeper level. A proper scrutiny of such problems might allow archaeology to escape from the selfimposed paradoxes and tautologies which currently plague its argurnents. Not the least interesting area in this respect would be some clear identiíication of the characteristics of 'pathological' explanations-those which are rejected and yet which appear to use normally acceptable reasoning on sound data.
At least part of the confusion about explanation in archaeology arises from the mistaken belief that there is one universal form of archaeological explanation structure appropriate at a11 levels, in a11 contexts. Attempts have been made to say something which would logically characterize all archaeological explanations but which simply succeed in describing, with varying success, certain modes of explanation used at certain scales, in certain contexts to answer certain archaeological questions. After all, the explanation of the recurrence of a certain house plan may have a logical structure of one kind, whilst the explanation of thõ collapse of the Maya or Mycenaeans may have quite another; the explanation of complex events in sophisticated systems is an especially important and ill-understood area (Tuggle, Townsend & Riley, 1972, 8) .
If archaeological explanations exist for many diíTerent purposes, and are of many diierent logical forms at varied levels in differing contexts, the appropriate procedures forjudging and testing their accuracy, relevance and logical adequacy have yet to be explicitly uncovered; we must therefore resist an ill-fitting determination to force the patterns of archaeological reasoning within those supposed to hold for other disciplines (Clarke, 1972a) . Nevertheless, we can anticipate some bases for such judgements. It has already emerged that one test of the relevance and adequacy of an archaeological explanation is the relevance and adequacy of i t s~ -hypothetical elements. If the hypothetical is not relevant to the particular scale or context, as in leaps in archaeological reasoning. Without such the 'tribal' explanations of the Mousterian, then a body of theory these critical leaps do indeed the explanation fails. Second, severa1 different take-off and become a free-fight of creativ-I explanations ma7 still compete for attention and here, amongst other criteria, it is the explanation which derives from or implies the existente of the more powerful theory which is to be preferred. At the last, even when an explanation is proven not to be trivial, tautologous, circular, redundant or statistically accidental it always remains 'conventiona19-relative to the state of contemporary knowledge, a particular paradigm view and a given metaphysical position.
General theory One of the prizes denied to us by the partitioned regionalism and specialism of the Old Archaeology is the explicit realization that there is or could be a comprehensive archaeological general theory. The difliculty with this intriguing possibility has never been a lack of forms which this theory might take and -areas within which it might fulminate but rather the conversethe infinitv of kinds of theory which might conceivably be appropriate for archaeology and the familiar problem of choice, where to search in the infinity? An earlier response was either to import the Historicism of Spengler and Toynbee, the Determinism of Ellsworth Huntington, the modified Marxism of Childe and others. or to react by rejecting the possibility of general archaeological theory and to disappear into the depths of particular research problems with the rapidity of hot stones on snow. Now, this prize may not yet be within our grasp but a possibly emerging theoretical form does now seem distantly perceivable. We have seen that the rising interest in archaeological philosophy naturally leads to necessary metaphysical theories of archaeological concepts, epistemological theories of archaeological information and classiíication and logical theories of archaeological reasoning. Here is certainly a body of necessary but unfulfilled theory which overlies and permeates a series of other levels of archaeological theory that translate and explain the relationships between classes of archaeological phenomena; it is these fancy-an irresponsible art for& These other levels of archaeological theory may be crudely expressed as the steps latent in any archaeological interpretation, relating: r (I) The range of hominid activity patterns an social and environmental processes whic once existed, over a specified time and area.
(2) The sample and traces of these (I) thrt were deposited at the time.
I
(3) The sample of that sample (2) which survived to be recovered.
(4) The sample of that sample (3) which wt recovered by excavation or coilection. The pairwise relationships between thes levels generates the essential set of predepositional, postdepositional, retrieval, analytical and interpretive models and theory which aii archaeologists intuitively employ in the intei pretive leaps from the excavated data to the written report, covering the interpretive pr0-q from the grave to publication. Predepositimal and depositional themy-covers the nature of the relationships between specified hominid activities, social patterns and environmental factors, one with another y~d with the sample and traces which were at the time deposited in the archaeological record; largely a social, environmental and statistical theory relating behavioural variability to variability in the record, linking levels (I) and (7' above. Postdepositionul thory-the nature of the relationships between the sample and traces as initially deposited and their subsequent recycling, movement, disturbance, erosion, traa formation or destruction; largely a microgeomorphological and statistical theory linking (2) and (3).
Retrkval theory-the nature of the relationships between the surviving sample (3) and the characteristics of the excavation or collection process which selectively operated upon it to produce (4); largely a theory of sampling, field research design and flexible response strategies unsge,ciíied steps which underly the critical linking (3) and (4).
#izui'ytical theory-the nature of the relationships between the observations (4), which become the data, and their subsequent opera-L tional treatment under selective modelling, testing, analysis, experimentation, storage a<d publication; largely a theory of information retrieval, selection, discarding, evaluation, compaction and decision costs, linking (&o-() via &e interpretive theory. Interpretive theory-the nature of the relationships between archaeological patterns establiahed by analysis and verified by.experiment, and predictions about the directly unobservable ancient behavioural and environmental patterns; bgely a theory of prediction, explanation and model evaluation linking (4) These are, of course, not the only areas of mhaeological theory but with archaeological metaphysical theory, epistemological theory and logical theory they clearly together constitute the nucleus of that theorv-currentlv intuitive or unsatisfactory but gradually being specified -which makes archaeolo; the d i~~~l i n e it is L and not merely the discipline of its operations, whether artistic, mathematic or scientific. Certainly, part of archaeological theory, an important part of the predepositional and int&pretivetheories, may b e r9uced to social theory and might conversely be derived therefrom; emphasizing the great significance of social as Well as e&ro&ental skdies for the archaeologist. However, this is but a small part of archaeological theory and even in this restricted bu< i m~o r t k t area the ~rimitive t e m and corre1ak-i concepts of social theory will require an appropriately spec3ied transformation to conform with the sDace. time and L sample characteristics of the equivalent archaeological data. The wider area of archaeological theory either treats relationships of a purely archaeological kind, or processes with space and time scales for which there is no social terminology, or pattems which nowhere survive within the sample of recent human behaviour. A r h l o g y in essence then is the discipline with the theory and practice for the recovery of unobservable hominid behaviour patterns from indirect traces in bad sarnples.
T H E N E W PERSPECTIVE
In the later postwar decades (1950s-1970s) the boundaries of archaeological consciousness and potential receded with great suddenness. Not surprisingly, archaeologists have been ieft perplexed by this phenomenon and its uncertain consequences. They have a choice-to continue to operate within the limited field space of traditional archaeology, in which case the New Archaeology does not exist for them, or they can step outside their former habitat and meditate upon its unsatisfactory nature and problems which that system could not ask or answer. For there exists, mathematically and philosophically, a class of problems for any language system which cannot be explained in that system's current form and we therefore move to new languages and new disciplinary systems not only to answer former questions which could* not be answered but also to abandon former questions and answers which had no meaning. Nevertheless, by the same proposition we can predict the transience of the New Archaeology itself-but we should not confuse transience with insignificante.
New Archaeology represents a precipitate, unplanned and unfinished exploration of new disciplinary field space, conducted with very varied success in an atmosphere of complete uncertainty. What at first appeared to be merely a period of technical re-equipment has produced profound practical, theoretid and philosophical problems to which the new archaeologies have responded with diverse new methods, new observations, new paradigms and new theory. However, unlike its parent, the New Archaeology is as yet a set of questions rather than a set of answers; when the questions are answered it too will be Old Archaeology.
The renewed concern with theory is refreshing after the furtive treatment that this crucial aspect widely received (except in the American school) after the scientism and historicism of the 1920s-30s. It re-emphasizes that such theory exists, in however unsatisfactory a form, in everything that an archaeologist does regardless
